The Zombie Argument Against Physicalism in the Philosophy of Mind: David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, and Robert Kirk
This article focuses on the views of David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, and Robert Kirk regarding the zombie argument. Chalmers claims that subjective experience cannot be fully explained by physical processes, highlighting the “hard problem” of consciousness. Kripke questions the necessary identity between mental and physical states through his modal argument. Kirk, who initially used the zombie argument against physicalism, later adopted a more critical perspective. The article explores both the challenges the argument raises for materialist ontologies and its conceptual limitations. It concludes that understanding phenomenal consciousness requires acknowledging the explanatory limits of physicalism.
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