As one of the prolific writers of the twentieth century, Iris Murdoch stands out primarily as a moral philosopher, yet she possesses a wide range of interests that span various philosophical disciplines, including ontology, theology, and aesthetics. Despite this breadth of engagement, Murdoch has been criticized for her apparent lack of concern with women’s issues during her lifetime. The primary aim of this study is to assess the validity of such criticisms directed at Murdoch. Although Murdoch cannot be straightforwardly identified as a feminist theorist—and some of her statements may seem to support these accusations—she frequently addresses women’s issues in both her fictional and theoretical works. Accordingly, this study argues that Murdoch was not indifferent to women’s problems; rather, she adopted a philosophical perspective and methodology distinct from those of her feminist contemporaries. Indeed, women’s issues stem from ethical theories and social practices that are nourished by the subject–object dichotomy. Such practices not only give rise to problems specific to women but also to broader human crises such as migration, refugeehood, genocide, violence, and colonization. Therefore, the path toward resolving these issues lies in constructing a new subject–subject ethics grounded in love and attention.