Examination of Strong Representation Theories in Terms of Pain Experience with Arguments for Transparency and Appearance/Reality Distinction
In the philosophy of mind, according to strong representationalist theories, the phenomenal aspect of conscious states is believed to be fully explainable by reducing it to representational content. Examples of perceptual experiences like pain, where the object is not entirely determinate, are often used to develop arguments against strong representationalist theories. According strong representationalist theories, the phenomenal features of consciousness can be reduced to representational content, and representational content can be linked to external physical processes through tracking theories, aligning with physicalist theories. In this article, challenges posed by the transparency argument of bodily senses in the context of the pain experience will be addressed, particularly in the framework of strong representationalist theories. It will be argued that the proposed Reality/Appearance distinction argument, which is put forward to highlight the distinctiveness of the pain experience, is based on an implicit presupposition of the object/perception/action distinction. In the final part of the article, it will be contended that the Reality/Appearance distinction argument cannot be grounded, especially in the context of the empirical data from cognitive sciences.
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