Property Dualism as a Contemporary Stronghold of Dualism in Philosophy of Mind: A Multidimensional Comparison between Substance Dualism and Property Dualism
The most dominant position in the discussions of contemporary philosophy of mind is undoubtedly physicalism. However, physicalism's objective point of view does not offer an encompassing account of phenomenal consciousness. There are increasing numbers of philosophers who accept the opposition between mental and physical, due to serious objections against explanatory models that reduce the phenomenal properties of the contents of inner experience to physical properties. This has meant a revival of dualism in contemporary philosophy of mind. This revival is not in favor of substance dualism, but in favor of property dualism holding that the body has both physical and mental properties. On the one hand, anti-physicalist arguments are considered as proponents of property dualism, and on the other hand, property dualism is seen as a solution to the dilemmas of substance dualism. In this study, whether property dualism constitutes a stronger alternative to physicalism than substance dualism is addressed in two ways. First, the possibility that objections to physicalism can provide a basis for substance dualism as well as property dualism is examined, and in the second step, it is discussed whether the problems caused by substance dualism can be solved by property dualism.
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