An Inquiry into The Epistemology of Late Wittgenstein: Hinge Commitments and Hinge Epistemology
The epistemology that Wittgenstein’s late works seem to suggest has gradually attracted more attention in academic circles past 25 years. This is mainly because of the groundbreaking perspective, promised especially in On Certainty, concerning the debates of scepticism which play an essential role in shaping modern epistemology. What lies behind this promise is the existence of some basic commitments, put into work in every rational justification, while they are themselves somehow exempted from it. Wittgenstein calls these commitments, which are unusual in terms of traditional epistemology, hinge commitments. Based on these commitments, Wittgenstein not only offers an answer to the problem of skepticism, which is one of the fundamental problems of modern epistemology, but also lays original claims to deal with the issues largely debated in modern epistemology such as rational justification, certainty, and belief. The main purpose of this study is to determine the qualities of these commitments and to discuss the possibilities offered by hinge epistemology based on them. To this aim, I will first discuss why Wittgenstein talks about such assumptions, then the nature of these commitments and different ideas about them in contemporary literature will be put under scrutiny. Finally, hinge epistemology and its potential will be deliberated.
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