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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Functionalist-Type Identity Theory and Problem of Consciousness
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1 Kilis 7 Aralık Üniversitesi, Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü 79000, Kilis,
Turkey
Received: 23 June 2020 | Published online: 20 August 2020
© 2020 by the Authors. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution -Noncommercial 4.0 International License (CC-by the license) ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ )
Abstract
David Lewis, particularly with respect to his resort to functionalist intuitions, was one of the important figures among the defenders of Type Identity Theory. According to this theory, any type of mental state is actually nothing but a certain type of neurochemical state. Perhaps the most effective and destructive criticism against this reductionist approach came from Thomas Nagel’s famous essay “What is it like to be a bat?”. For Nagel, Type Identity and Functionalism in particular and Physicalism, in general, fail to explain a pivotal point about the mind: Consciousness. In this article, I will first explain the theory defended by Lewis. In the second section, I will present Nagel’s criticism against all the theories which fall under the category of Physicalism in general. In the last section, I will first explain how Lewis would respond to this criticism, later I will explain how Nagel would counter Lewis’ criticism. In the end, I will briefly comment on this debate.
Keywords
Identity theory
analytic functionalism
Lewis
Nagel
consciousness
reduction.
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