Is the Instrumental Rationality Value-Free?
Instrumental rationality differs from substantive rationality in that it focuses on maximizing the results of choices and on the means provides the best results. The distinction between instrumental and substantial rationality is based on the distinction between theoretical and practical rationality. While theoretical rationality is related to our beliefs and mental processes, practical rationality is related to our behaviors and actions. Although the distinction between theoretical and practical rationality is generally accepted, the rationale for this distinction is not as clear as the distinction itself. This article aims to examine this rationale and question whether the instrumental rationality is value-free. If instrumental rationality can be demonstrated to be value-laden, the relationship between theoretical and practical rationality can be revised again in the context of value.
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