The allegations that Aristotle was a soul-body dualist, and that he believed in the immortality and/or the transmigration of the soul, are not compatible with the arguments of his work On the Soul, especially with the first book. In the first book, Aristotle tries to refute the monist position by arguing that if the soul is reduced to the body, there would be no principle of life, distinguishing the body from a corpse. Aristotle rejects the dualist position by claiming that even the affections of the soul that are regarded as peculiar to it are not independent/separable from the body and asserting that these affections are inherent in a matter [logos enylos]. Even the geometrical figures have more independence from the body than the affections of the soul have. The affections are rather like “snub” which cannot be thought separately from the nose it signifies. The soul is the actuality [entelekheia] of the body that keeps it ready to be in activity [energeia]. Thus, it is neither reducible to nor separable from the body. This study aims to present Aristotle’s position, which is neither monist nor a dualist one.