This study contends that democracy, grounded in the principles of equality and pluralism, paradoxically becomes susceptible to flawed decision-making due to these very ideals. It critically examines the epistemic deficiencies inherent in democratic participation, positing that the right to vote should not solely be justified by equality but also by considerations of knowledge and competence to enhance the quality of political decision-making. The study advocates for an epistocratic model of governance, wherein citizens endowed with epistemic competence assume a more significant role, thereby preserving democracy's foundational commitment to equality. In contrast to aristocracy, epistocracy does not endorse minority rule but seeks political legitimacy through demonstrable competence. Drawing upon Condorcet’s principle of the rational majority, the study argues that epistocracy augments, rather than undermines, democratic engagement. The research addresses two key questions: how electoral outcomes might shift if voting were contingent upon competence, and how a system in which only the "competent" can exercise the vote would function. It concludes that an epistocratic system, by prioritizing competence, may be more democratic and conducive to the common good, harmonizing individual equality with the collective capacity for rational decision-making.