AccScience Publishing / BIJP / Volume 15 / Issue 3 / DOI: 10.29228/beytulhikme.81307
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RESEARCH ARTICLE

A Critical Solution Proposal on the Nature of Hypothetical Syllogisms Within the Framework of Mental Logic Theory and Classical Logic

ZEYNEP ÇELİK1
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1 Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fak., Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Bölümü 46100, Kahramanmaraş, Türkiye
BIJP 2025, 15(3), 1037–1062; https://doi.org/10.29228/beytulhikme.81307
Received: 20 March 2025 | Published online: 27 September 2025
© 2025 by the Authors. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution -Noncommercial 4.0 International License (CC-by the license) ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ )
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Abstract

Logic is divided into two as a science and a way of thinking. In this study, the theory of mental logic, which partially rejects the mental representation of logic as a way of thinking, is discussed in the context of hypothetical syllogisms and compared with classical logic. Furthermore, these two systems of logic are subjected to a critical evaluation using formal tools. As a result of the comparison, it was revealed that the hypothetical syllogism form of classical logic and the schemas presented by mental logic overlap at certain points, but they adopt different approaches to the cause of systematic fallacy in the inference process. In this study, an alternative theoretical model is developed on the basis of the concepts of “necessary”, ‘possible’ and “impossible” offered by modal logic in order to make sense of and overcome this divergence. In addition to bridging the gap between classical logic and mental logic, this new model aims to increase individuals' awareness and provide a more solid and consistent basis for hypothetical syllogism. Therefore, the model shows that the logical structure in the human mind can be reconstructed in line with various epistemological perspectives.

Keywords
Formal logic
mental logic
reasoning
hypothetical syllogism
necessity
possibility
impossibility.
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Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, Print ISSN: 1303-8303, Published by AccScience Publishing
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