In this study, we try to look at Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy holistically rather than the early and late periods in the literature. For this, we focus on the concept of imponderable evidence, which we think captures Wittgenstein's conception of reality. This concept provides the link between Tractarian ideas, which are ponderable, and post-Tractarian ideas, which are imponderable. In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein analysed reality via the distinction between what can be said and what can be shown. In the same work, he concludes the Tractarian project by stating that he has said what can be said, but the real work to be done is what can be shown. Based on Wittgenstein's ideas after the Tractatus, our study focuses on what can be shown, that is, the imponderable.  The aim of our study is to show that Wittgenstein's conception of imponderable reality is objective, contrary to the perception in analytic philosophy. The concept of imponderable reality is grounded in the idea of incorporating the subjective nature of meaning into philosophical discourse in an objective manner. To include the subjective nature of meaning in philosophical discourse, Wittgenstein set certain rules and criteria in his post-Tractatus works. Thus, based on these rules and criteria, he proposes a conception of objectivity that is imponderable but self-evident.