AccScience Publishing / BIJP / Volume 12 / Issue 4 / DOI: 10.29288/beytulhikme.65739
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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Quine, Laudan and the Normativity Problem of Naturalized Epistemology 

Mahmut Özer1
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1 Aksaray Üniversitesi, Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü 68100, Aksaray, Turkey
BIJP 2022, 12(4), 913–937; https://doi.org/10.29288/beytulhikme.65739
Received: 15 August 2022 | Published online: 11 December 2022
© 2022 by the Authors. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution -Noncommercial 4.0 International License (CC-by the license) ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ )
Abstract

Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” is the locus classicus of naturalism in epistemology. Many traditional epistemologists criticized the naturalization of epistemology specifically targeting this article. The critics argue that Quine abolishes the normativity of epistemology. For he proposes epistemology as a chapter of psychology. Laudan, like Quine, believes that epistemology should be naturalized. However, he criticizes Quine’s project of naturalization for similar reasons as Quine’s critics. Instead, he proposes a new project that he calls “normative naturalism”. In this work, I will first argue against the critics of Quine and then argue that both Quine’s and Laudan’s naturalized epistemologies are hypothetically normative.

 

Keywords
Quine
Laudan
naturalized epistemology
justification
hypothetical normativity.
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Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, Print ISSN: 1303-8303, Published by AccScience Publishing