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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Being Unconsciously Conscious
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1 Marmara Üniversitesi, Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü 34722, İstanbul,
Turkey
Received: 15 August 2022 | Published online: 28 December 2022
© 2022 by the Authors. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution -Noncommercial 4.0 International License (CC-by the license) ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ )
Abstract
First-order theories of consciousness and higher-order theories of consciousness are rivals in the studies of consciousness and provide different explanations concerning the consciousness of a mental state. First-order theories defend that it is not possible to be unconsciously conscious whereas higher-order theories argue that it is possible. In this paper, I discuss these differences to see if there is indeed a deep disagreement or if the disagreement is merely a verbal dispute and thereby see if the two theories can be reconciled. In doing so, I also explain what it means to be unconsciously conscious granted that it is possible.
Keywords
Consciousness
conscious states of mind
theories of consciousness
Rosenthal
Dretske.
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