AccScience Publishing / BIJP / Volume 12 / Issue 2 / DOI: 10.18491/beytulhikme.1859
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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Two Approaches in the Metaphysics of Science: On Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism 

Ömer Fatih Tekin1
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1 Kastamonu Üniversitesi, Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü 37150, Kastamonu, Turkey
BIJP 2022, 12(2), 437–458; https://doi.org/10.18491/beytulhikme.1859
Received: 10 October 2021 | Published online: 25 June 2022
© 2022 by the Authors. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution -Noncommercial 4.0 International License (CC-by the license) ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ )
Abstract

In this paper, the scientific realism/anti-realism debate, which is one of the most popular topics in the metaphysics of science, will be examined in supporting the realistic wing. In this respect, the discussion will be conducted by keeping the subjects of ‘existence of an external mind-independent world’ and ‘unobservable entities’ at the center of this paper. In the context of understanding the world, ‘Science’ activity is not the sum of the research carried out only by considering empirical data; on the contrary, it will be claimed that it is an endeavor that pursues unknown but interesting things (such as protons, photons, or viruses) and tries to give meaning to the world. Thus, against the empirical rigid attitude of anti-realism –bearing in mind the views of logical positivists; it will be illustrated that scientific realism is an understanding based on metaphysics and has a philosophical basis.

Keywords
Scientific realism
anti-realism
observability problem
empiricism
metaphysics.
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Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, Print ISSN: 1303-8303, Published by AccScience Publishing