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RESEARCH ARTICLE
A Dilemma for Epistemic Infinitism
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1 Koç Üniversitesi, İnsani Bilimler ve Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü 34450, İstanbul,
Turkey
Received: 30 October 2019 | Published online: 19 March 2020
© 2020 by the Authors. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution -Noncommercial 4.0 International License (CC-by the license) ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ )
Abstract
I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true.
Keywords
Epistemic infinitism
propositional justification
inferential justification
the epistemic regress problem
Peter Klein.
References
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