Author :
Abstract
Islam offers heaven to those who have faith and do good deeds on Earth. However, there are problems with the preferability of an immortal afterlife, as Bernard Williams argues. Immortal life can be boring, one may not maintain her identity for such a long time, or the life may not be recognizable as a human life. The problem lies in the categorical desires. If categorical desires —the desires that motivate us to live— change over time, one cannot remain the same person throughout time. If, however, the desires do not change, the life cannot be recognizable as a human life. We claim that al-Fārābī's approach can help us to sidestep this challenge, compatible with an Islamic perspective. al-Fārābī thinks that a moral life is required for happiness. We suggest that moral life is an unchanging categorical desire, but the ways of satisfying this categorical desire can change.
Keywords
Abstract
Islam and Christianity offer heaven to those who do good deeds on Earth. However, there are problems with the preferability of an immortal afterlife as Bernard Williams argues. Immortal life can be boring, or one may not maintain her identity for such a long time, or the life may not be recognizable as a human life. The problem lies in the categorical desires. If categorical desires —the desires that motivate us to live— changes over time, one cannot remain the same person throughout time. If, however, the desires do not change, the life cannot be recognizable as a human life. We claim that Al-Farabi's approach can help us to overcome this challenge, compatible with a theistic perspective. Al-Farabi thinks that a moral life is required for happiness. We suggest that moral life is an unchanging categorical desire but the ways of satisfying this categorical desire can change.
