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Abstract
This article aims to analyze, from an epistemological perspective, Aristotle's claim in Topics I.2 that dialectic is "a way leading to the first principles." Although Aristotle defines the dialectical method as a type of syllogism that derives its premises from endoxa (generally accepted opinions), he simultaneously assigns this method the function of reaching the foundations of the philosophical sciences. This creates a problem concerning how an investigation proceeding from endoxa can provide an epistemic transition to the certain and indemonstrable first principles upon which demonstration (apodeixis) is based. The article addresses this problem in two stages: First, the position of the concepts of endoxa and phainomena (phenomena), which constitute the subject matter of dialectic, is evaluated within Aristotle's epistemology. It is demonstrated that the concept of phenomenon carries a dual meaning, showing that endoxa are not limited to common beliefs but include the experience-based judgments of tekhne holders as well. Second, the functioning of the dialectical practice used in Aristotle's works is analyzed, arguing that its examinational (eksetastike) structure enables the attainment of a science's definitional principle through a systematic process of diaporesis (examination of both sides of a puzzle). The article does not attribute meanings to dialectic such as "proving" or "discovering" principles; rather, it concludes that dialectic functions as a method that establishes the necessity of these principles by organizing the internal debates of philosophical disciplines and the prevailing opinions on their subject matters within specific objectives.
Keywords
Abstract
This article aims to analyze, from an epistemological perspective, Aristotle's claim in Topics I.2 that dialectic is "a way leading to the first principles." Although Aristotle defines the dialectical method as a type of syllogism that derives its premises from endoxa (generally accepted opinions), he simultaneously assigns this method the function of reaching the foundations of the philosophical sciences. This creates a problem concerning how an investigation proceeding from endoxa can provide an epistemic transition to the certain and indemonstrable first principles upon which demonstration (apodeixis) is based. The article addresses this problem in two stages: First, the position of the concepts of endoxa and phainomena (phenomena), which constitute the subject matter of dialectic, is evaluated within Aristotle's epistemology. It is demonstrated that the concept of phenomenon carries a dual meaning, showing that endoxa are not limited to common beliefs but also include the experience-based judgments of tekhne holders. In the second stage, the functioning of the dialectical practice used in Aristotle's works is analyzed, arguing that its examinational (eksetastike) structure enables the attainment of a science's definitional principle through a systematic process of diaporesis (the examination of both sides of a puzzle). The article does not attribute meanings to dialectic such as "proving" or "discovering" principles; rather, it concludes that dialectic functions as a method that establishes the necessity of these principles by organizing the internal debates of philosophical disciplines and the prevailing opinions on their subject matters within specific objectives.
