Author :
Abstract
Tek dereceden bilinç kuramları (first-order theories of consciousness) ile üst dereceden bilinç kuramları (higher-order theories of consciousness) bilinç çalışmalarını içeren literatürde birbirlerinin rakibi olarak bilinirler ve bilinçli zihin durumlarıyla ilgili sundukları açıklamalarda farklı yaklaşımlar gösterirler. Tek dereceden bilinç kuramları bilinçsizce bilinçli olmanın mümkün olmadığını, üst dereceden kuramlar ise mümkün olduğunu savunur. Bu makaledeki amacım iki kuram arasındaki yaklaşım farklarını ortaya koymak, bu farkların önemli bir ilkesel anlaşmazlıktan mı yoksa sadece sözel bir anlaşmazlıktan mı kaynaklandığını inceleyerek iki kuramın uyumlu olup olmadığını görmek ve bu tartışmanın ışığında bilinçsizce bilinçli olmanın eğer mümkünse ne anlama geldiğinden bahsetmektir.
Keywords
Abstract
First-order theories of consciousness and higher-order theories of consciousness are rivals in the studies of consciousness and provide different explanations concerning the consciousness of a mental state. First-order theories defend that it is not possible to be unconsciously conscious whereas higher-order theories argue that it is possible. In this paper, I discuss these differences to see if there is indeed a deep disagreement or if the disagreement is merely a verbal dispute and thereby see if the two theories can be reconciled. In doing so, I also explain what it means to be unconsciously conscious granted that it is possible.
Keywords
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