

## Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Bergsonian Conservatism, and Passive Revolution

### *Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Bergsoncu Muhafazakarlık ve Pasif Devrim*

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**Abstract:** The 1930s in Turkey is a highly controversial socio-political topic with two main competing interpretations: the liberal-positivists consider the 1930's transformation as a progressive move whereas conservative-idealists regard it as a top-down break from tradition and history. However, there are other readings that bridge these two positions. To analyze one of these, this study establishes links between Mustafa Şekib Tunç (1886-1958), a Turkish psychologist and philosopher, the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941), the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), and the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). It does this through the latter's concept of "passive revolution" to contribute to the understanding of Turkey's socio-political transformation during the 1930s. The main argument is that Tunç's anti-empiricist and anti-positivist philosophy, based on Bergson's spiritualist and biologist-holisticism, meets with Durkheim's positivist collectivism. This enables Tunç to interpret the 1930s' passive revolution as a "conservative revolution" that found its expression in the formulation of the "unprivileged-classless-fused-mass" and an "organic society". Tunç, following Bergson, conceives history and society biologically, as a socio-functional whole that helps mask socio-political divisions and struggles within the society.

**Keywords:** Mustafa Şekip Tunç, conservatism, Henri Bergson, passive revolution. Turkish political life.



## Introduction

The philosophical background of the capitalist modernization project in Turkey is positivist, deterministic and enlightened. The founding elite of the Republic came from a positivist and vulgar materialist pedagogical formation (see Berkes 1998). Thus, positivism gave its philosophical color to the second half of the 1920s and 1930s in Turkey. Especially under the influence of Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), the “Turkish Durkheim” of Kemalist revolutions, (Berkes 1936: 242; Parla 1985), positivism became the “official philosophy” of the socio-political upheavals of that period.

However, after the armistice period (1918-1922), and especially from the 1930s onwards a new generation of thinkers put forward new theses for interpreting the War of Independence and Turkey’s subsequent high-speed modernization and Westernization. Although they remained on the edge of the mainstream philosophically and politically, they provided an influential alternative interpretation of Turkey’s modernization (İrem 2002a; İrem 2002b; İrem 1999, 2003). Prominent names in this group known today as the “conservative modernizers” or “conservative republicans” (Demirel 2002; İrem 2002a; İrem 1999), include Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Peyami Safa, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Ahmed Ağaoğlu and Hilmi Ziya Ülken. This conservative modernist intelligentsia, who undertook an active role in nation-building, were generally well-educated and well-acquainted with Western philosophy.

They therefore benefited greatly from Western sources in their critiques of “positivist sociologism” and “mechanist evolutionism”. The arguments developed against the dominant positivist political/ideological attitude of the period were generally expressed through the language and discourse developed by this group. These conservatives, who were opposed to the radical implementation of the reforms, and not to the idea of reform itself, were in favor of “measured” progress. On the one hand, they functioned as a “brake” against the risk of losing direction during the sweeping revolutionary developments (1923-1946); on the other hand, by reading the revolution as a result of the “creative power” of the Turkish nation, they legitimized it on a different level, thereby filling an important gap (Demirel 2002; İrem 2002a; İrem 2002b; İrem 1999, 2003).



In this respect, the climate of thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was also very rich in the intellectual material developed against positivist progressivism. By claiming that there is no intelligible relationship between reason and progress, Charles Renouvier (1815-1913), Emile Boutroux (1845-1921), Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) and finally Henri Bergson (1859-1941) seriously criticized naturalists, rationalists, determinists, scientists, and positivists. In particular, Bergson created an important front against philosophical approaches derived from materialism through a more or less coherent philosophical system formed from concepts like creative evolution, life movement, *elan vital*, spirit, intuition, becoming, and duration.

Bergson, who was enthusiastically embraced by spiritualists, idealists, mystics, romantics, and metaphysicists, has influenced a wide array of fields, ranging from art to philosophy and science to religion. He argues that existence consists of a single “becoming”, of which material and spiritual worlds are parts. What we call time cannot be measured because “becoming” proceeds creatively, without following any rules. Since the mind can only detect things that repeat at certain intervals, it is wrong to trust it. History is never linear. Therefore, what we call progress does not correspond to reality. There are stages only creatively formed by the “life move.” Consciousness also does not develop along a linear path. Instead, there are transitions from one stage to another, so historical and social events do not occur following certain rules and cannot be explained by them.

During Turkey’s early Republican era, Mustafa Şekip Tunç (1883-1958) was the one who took Bergson’s philosophy most seriously using it as intellectual ammunition against materialism and positivism (Ülken 1992: 377). According to Tunç, societal progress does not follow the laws of an external universal nature. Rather, it is realized by activating the internal dynamics of society, such as tradition, culture, and belief. Tunç engaged in an ideological/philosophical struggle with positivist-determinist ideas, which were allegedly no longer valid in the West, yet were still in force in Turkey in the form of a Durkheimian positivism, mainly adopted, celebrated, and shared by Gökçalp.

Accordingly, I argue that Tunç drew on Bergson to philosophize the



Turkish war of Independence and Kemalist revolutions. In Bergson, Tunç found an idealist, vitalist, voluntarist, and biologically-metaphored concept of history and progress, contrary to a materialistic, determinist, and mechanistic one. Especially, while a biological conception of history underpins the idea of “creative evolution”; a biological conception of society views it as a biological organism composed of various socio-functional parts. Just as no one can predict the results of “creative evolution”, so history is not nomothetical either. Although I partly follow İrem’s argument (2002; 2002; 1999, 2003) here, I push it a little bit further to claim that Bergsonian biologic-functionalist conservatism meets with a Durkheimian conception of society as a “biological organism” (Benton and Craib 2011: 91) in the Gökalpian formulation of the “unprivileged-classless-fused-mass”. In this way, Tunç contributed philosophically to the “passive revolution” of 1930s (see Yalman 2002: 34).

The paper is divided into five sections. The first deals with Bergson as a philosopher of time and evolution. The second discusses *The Idea of Progress* (2005). The third considers how Tunç formulates modern field of Turkish politics from a Bergsonian philosophy by focusing on the articles of “Conservatism and Liberalism” (1954). The fourth section discusses conservatism as a historical conscience, concentrating on Tunç’s article “Liberalism and Conscious Conservatism” (1956). The fifth section includes a discussion on the concepts of passive revolution and organic society.

### **Bergson as the Philosopher of Time and Evolution**

In Europe, circles that were overwhelmed by the dominance of intellect and matter -idealists, spiritualists, metaphysicists, romantics- embraced Bergson’s philosophy with great enthusiasm. In the early 1900s, the development of capitalist production relations and technology began to reshape social life, altering the sense of time and space while reducing good, beauty, and truth to practical benefit. This led to a common perception of “decadence” among the masses. Consequently, many writers reactively shifted to the poetic philosophy of Bergson, which addressed the souls and hearts. For example, his philosophy of time resonates in Marcel Proust’s *In Search of Lost Time* (1913-1917), George Bernard Shaw’s,



*Back to Methuselah*, and many others (Bozkurt 1995: 45–46).

According to Bergson (1944), time is not measurable because its way of movement is different from what we can perceive. If the smallest unit of time is the moment, time is not simply the sum of these moments coming together in certain quantities and measures. Therefore, our mind, which can only measure the repetitive relationship between similar parts, is helpless against time. In addition, the movement of time is neither linear nor repetitive but only evolves in a way that Bergson calls “creative moves”. According to Bergson, who conceived of life as a process of “becoming”, time is all of the stages of this “becoming”. He argues that the mind becomes dysfunctional when the relationship between the consciousness of becoming and the person is interrupted. Thus, what is to be done is to remake the connection between the two. However, this relationship cannot be grasped with the mind, but only sensed intuitively. When this is achieved, the person can gain the ability of creative moves. Those people (great men) who have this ability, change the course of history. Thus, things can be changed even in the form of progress (Bergson 1944).

By demonstrating the impossibility of universal laws specifying the course of time, Bergson also invalidated the three states (theological, metaphysical and positive) predicted by Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism. Therefore, anyone defending external interventions in socio-political life, as a form of “social engineering”, in accordance with these “so-called” laws was also wrong. As Bergson’s concept of time neutralized the oldest rivals -positivism-liberalism- conservatism refined the arguments it had long been defending. The claim of conservatism that the French Revolution had been a disaster and its opposition any interference in society for the purpose of social engineering thereby finally found a sound philosophical ground.

Bergson’s representation of time as small, gradual changes occurring in consciousness and his claim that societies also have consciousness meant that the past should be reevaluated. That is, what we call the past has not actually died but still lives. Past, present and future are intertwined. Hence, society is the whole of these three stages. The past cannot be denied because it is part of society’s current existence. This was



the notion of time that modernist conservatives enthusiastically embraced in Bergsonism. On the one hand, the helplessness of reason against time, and the fact that the creative movement is external to the person, made it possible to believe in a god that could be accepted as the source of this creative movement. On the other hand, typical conservative thought, which claims that human reason cannot shape history due to its imperfections found what it was looking in Bergsonism.

The arrival of Bergsonian philosophy in Turkey coincides with the decline of the Ottoman Empire as Turkish intellectuals began to understand Bergson's importance during the 1910s (for the introduction of Bergsonism to Turkey see Bayraktar 1998). Especially in the 1920s and 1930s, Bergsonism was well-understood and became a means to interpret socio-political events of the period. In particular, Tunç adopted and used Bergsonism as a conceptual tool to understand and explain the Turkish Revolution. Although these innovations in conservative thought could not ensure that conservative modernity was at the center of politics during the one-party era, they created a significant potential for the multi-party period after 1946.

### **The Concept of Progress in Mustafa Şekip Tunç**

Using Bergson, Tunç began a struggle against the well-known positivist claim that there is a law of progress. Notably, in his book *The Idea of Progress*, [Terakki Fikri] he narrates the story of how philosophers have considered the idea of progress since the earliest ages. Defending the claim that one of the most decisive conflicts in the history of thought is shaped around the idea of progress, he divides the history of thought, considered as a field of struggle, between progressists and traditionalists. From Plato to Aristo, from Saint Paul to Francis Bacon, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Hegel, John Locke, Charles Darwin, August Comte, from Renouvier to Bergson, he examines a wide range of ways of thinking about progressivism and traditionalism.

According to Tunç (2005), history and life constitutes a whole. The inanimate can be analyzed by observation and experiment, but the same methods are not valid for life and humanity; rather, to understand the living one needs skills like intuition, inspiration, and creation. Positivism



neither regards these abilities as valid nor questions the true meaning of life, so one side is always missing. Tunç, then, argues against naturalism which “may be defined as the thesis that there is (or can be) an essential unity of method between the natural and the social sciences” (Bhaskar 1998:3). If the idea of progress is a philosophy of nature and history, it has been made in two ways since the period of “awakening” (as Tunç calls it). The first one was evolutionism while the second is progressivism. We can also interpret these two ways of thinking as optimism and pessimism respectively (Tunç 2005: 20).

Tunç concludes that there are essentially two basic tendencies in philosophy. While the first, [*les anciens*] focuses on the past, the second [*les modernes*] emphasizes the future. These trends can be defined based on where they place their “golden ages” in history. According to the former, the golden age passed. The more we away from the ideals of that period, the more humanity drifts into despair. Therefore, the most reasonable response is to maintain traditions to preserve social stability and order. The wisest men lived in the past. The ideal figures of discipline and morality are in the past. Thus, the past is superior to the present and future (Tunç 2005: 22).

In contrast, for the latter tendency, golden age lies in the future. The new is brave, pro-freedom, and creative. If history is an accumulation of knowledge, undoubtedly the new is more advanced. Each discovery and invention reveals another secret of the universe, so the ordinary person of the present or future knows more than the scholars of the past. Until the nineteenth century, pro-new ideas were revolutionary. However, after their victories over conservatives, they shifted to an evolutionary progressivism. Although the ideal had not changed, the rhythm of progress had been reevaluated, leading to the adoption of a moderate version of change (Tunç 2005: 22–23).

### **From the Unity of Becoming to the Duality of the Political Sphere**

In his article “Conservatism and Liberalism”, published in 1954 in the journal *Turkish Thought*, [*Türk Düşüncesi*] Tunç shows that two political ideologies -conservatism and liberalism- were born out of the uniqueness of becoming.



Tunç argues that within Mother Nature, there is an order, independent of our minds. While the laws of nature prevail in the order of inanimate objects, living things are subjected to instincts. The power in this latter order has a double function: it simultaneously change and conserves. This power is operational in both the inanimate and living world. For instance, it carbonizes the forests, it turns coal into diamonds in the inanimate world; and it causes the evolution of single cells into complex organisms in the living world. Since, modern science cannot explain these extraordinary transformations, it considers them as the result of coincidences. Tunç, argues, however, rather than coincidences, they are the creations of an instinctive consciousness in nature that has spread to all beings. The instincts of people and animals to live are nothing but the result of this self-consciousness. Human consciousness is also under its influence. All creative activities, such as art originates from the ability to relate to this self-consciousness. Science is nothing more than a technique to define the relationship between things. He also links the emergence of great discoveries or genius to the intuitive relationship established with self-consciousness (Tunç 1954: 90–91).

Once this becoming in Mother Nature has been understood or sensed, its manifestations can be seen in society and civilization. Accordingly, societies are in a continuous evolution. For example, closed societies begin to become liberalized and conscious due to the influence of external interventions. However, many traditions in the form of superstition created in the age of unconsciousness also survive in the new period. Due to these superstitions, which create gaps in consciousness, society may fall into the grip of ignorance. Thus, Tunç attributes the 31 March incident and the Patrona Halil rebellion<sup>1</sup> to the ignorance persisting at that time in Turkey; hence, he advocates avoiding demagoguery in politics (Tunç 1954: 91).

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<sup>1</sup> Patrona Halil Rebellion being a mob uprising in 1730 against Sultan Ahmed III finished the period called “Tulip Period” while 31 March Incident was a reactionary riot in 1909 against the political dominance of committee of union and progress and to certain gains of Second Constitutional Era. Tunç seems to interpret both events as a result of social ignorance.





To create a civilized society, one must first understand the principles of nature before applying them to the social life. This was done in the past during the enlightened periods, such as Ancient Greece, the Renaissance, and the eighteenth century, when the past, present and future were thoroughly analyzed and various judgments were made. Accordingly, those who believed that the past was more valuable than the present were conservative while those who accepted that the future offered a higher existence were progressive or liberal. This, created the two tendencies in politics in the form of political parties. The stronger mark that the yesterday left, the stronger conservatism was and *vice versa* (Tunç 1954: 91–92).

After these reflections on the formation of conservatism and liberalism, Tunç applies this perspective to Turkish political life. While the People’s Republican Party (PRP) was liberal in its early years, it could not keep up with change and took a conservative turn. Thus, in turn, Democrat Party (DP) became liberal. According to Tunç, when democracy was still in its infancy, clashes between these two parties were very violent. However, once democracy takes root, the two trends continue in greater harmony which is indeed what happened in conscious societies in Europe (Tunç 1954: 89).

### **Conservatism’s Historical Conscience: Bergsonism**

In his article “Liberalism and Conscious Conservatism” published in the magazine *Turkish Fatherland* [*Türk Yurdu*] in 1956, Tunç makes various criticisms of both liberals and socialists to support a conscious understanding of history from a Bergsonian point of view.

Tunç argues that liberalism based on the principle of *laissez faire laissez passer* first emerged in England. It promoted the development of capitalism in favor of that country and a new economic era. Based on the principle of free competition, it encouraged the accumulation of wealth. Supporters of liberal ideals formed a liberal party that prioritized unlimited material gains. Thus, an era of materialism, greed and selfishness began. The job of curbing the speed of this development fell to the conservatives because there were both material and spiritual gains to protect. This was not the task of a reactionary conservatism but a “conscious con-



servatism". Nevertheless, the winners were the liberals, who accumulated an enormous fortune over the following 150 years (Tunç 2010: 99–100).

Meanwhile, the workers employed in the factories lived in misery. This was how the rebellious proletarian class was born against the bourgeoisie. The situation of those living in colonized countries was no better. Although, according to Tunç, historical materialism was born in this period, it would be a mistake to expand class conflicts of this period to the whole of history. Assuming that human intelligence creates only techniques, humans have enslaved themselves to technical development. History can never be grasped as a whole and its course cannot be known. Tunç claims that the “beings” of life do not occur according to mechanical rules. Just as the transformation of a human fetus into an human adult (a biological analogy) is not a technical event, the formation of societies is the result of constructive and creative moves that exceed their intelligence. The secrets of this being can never be known (Tunç 2010: 100–101).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, major philosophers of the United States of America (USA) and Europe rejected the mechanical theories of evolution in favor of contingent and creative evolution. Following them, Tunç tries to describe social life using a tree analogy (another biological metaphor) by considering the nation as whole with its roots, trunk and leaves. The roots are traditions and customs; the trunk directly attached to the roots is the nation; the fruits are elites and intellectuals. Fruits live on the “sun of liberty”. In a functionalist manner, a strict division of labor is required within the country to enable liberties to flourish. Without this professional diversity, a strict order will prevail, which means the absence of freedom. In such a situation, during the *Tanzimat*, in Ottoman Empire, conservatism could not go beyond a certain kind of “traditionalism” (Tunç 2010: 101).

Tunç claims that the past is much richer than the present as it is an ocean into which the rivers of all periods flow. Conscious conservatism means being connected to the past by a deep emotional bond that we cannot escape from under the pretext of changing civilization; if we try, this “neglect” will lead us to rootlessness. Nations that do not know their history are imprisoned in the present, which prevents them from recog-



nizing themselves or seeing and thinking about future. A gap in history is like a gap in consciousness. Therefore, “conscious conservatism” for Tunç (2010: 102) means “historical consciousness”. Not knowing the past, not hearing, results in ignorance.

According to conservative modernizers, bringing the previously neglected pre-Ottoman Turkish history to light, during the first years of the Revolution, was a good thing. However, it was not good to put a great distance between the Ottoman Period and the New Republic. In particular, “revolution of the language” was one of the interventions that prevented the past from being sensed. Society should be considered in its historical integrity and improved only through moves from within its social creativity- not by external interventions. Thus, he interprets the Turkish Revolution from a Bergsonian rather than positivist perspective whereby Turkish society through its creative potential, initiated change in the personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. While there were occasional artificial interventions influenced by the West, the determining factor remained the emergence of the natural and creative power of the society.

### **Organic Society and Passive Revolution**

According to İrem (2002: 59; 1999: 175), conservatives imagine people as an “irrational essence”, similar to the German romantic concepts of *volk* and *volkgeist*. It is “unconscious” but “always an active political actor.” Because it cannot be either grasped or governed by the intellect, it is personified by the charismatic leader (İrem 1999: 175). The charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey can be seen this way. However, this reading, which sees the society as an organic whole also resonates with German and Italian totalitarian regimes. In this sense, the conception of society and people of German Nazism and Italian Fascism is quite close to the reading of this Bergsonian conservative society as an irrational organic whole.

Here, it is important to look at how Bergsonian conservatism considers the individual-society relationship that was widely discussed during the foundation of the Republic. Republican conservatives targeted the Durkheimian positivist-collectivist approach, which was adopted by Gökalp, during the debates as to whether the Turkish revolution would



follow a liberal, socialist, or a unique path. In particular, Durkheim's naturalist thesis that the laws of positive science can be applied to society disturbed the conservatives. According to this thesis, the social was considered to react with external forces, just like the chemistry as defined by specific external laws. Gökalp also argued that normatively, society should come before the individual whereas, to conservatives, society was alive, dynamic, evolutionary, solidarist, and full of the energy of life. The real power of the free individual comes from her will, belief, and spirit not from external stimulants.

Likewise, Tunç emphasized the psychology of individuals, as biological and moral creatures (Oğuz 2015). While for Durkheim, the individual is just an animal without the society, Tunç (2005: 239) argued that individuals have, biologically and independently from the society, instincts and intuitions to live and create. Thus, instead of a holistic concept of society, that is external and coercive to the individual; society should be understood as an organism composed of individualistic psychological cells (Ülken 1992: 378).

Bergsonian thought, which ignores the reality of the social classes and considers society as a mystical and monolithic essence, was articulated to both Kemalism and most varieties of the Turkish right. In other words, both the ideas of Tunç, as a follower of Bergson, and ideas of Gökalp, as a follower of Durkheim, meet on the common ground that society results from socio-functional cells rather than antagonistic class struggles. Bergsonian conservatism thus provides a biological conception of history and a historical conception of society, according to which society is an organic whole. This supports the Kemalist notion of society being an indivisible whole, which in turn legitimated a "passive revolution", a "revolution without a revolution" (Gramsci 1971: 59) in the 1930s in Turkey. Since society was an organic whole, there could be no class struggle while the Kemalist power represented that whole in the form of a Rousseauian "general will" rather than a particular class or classes. Thus, philosophically and socio-politically, Bergsonian conservatism legitimated the passive revolution that intended to keep the subordinate classes (the peasantry and working class) in passivity rather than mobilizing them for the revolution, in contrast to the French Revolution.



## Conclusion

The ideological/philosophical matrix of Turkish modernization was largely borrowed from the positivist-enlightenment tradition of the West. However, one group of Conservative Republican Turkish intellectuals, who had witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, criticized the mainstream modernization model. Offering philosophical works to alleviate the devastating effects of the revolutionary process and define it on different grounds, this group was the only intellectual trend offering an “alternative West-ernization”.

Mustafa Şekip Tunç who was a prominent Conservative Republican, followed Bergson, in his biologism, vitalism, dynamism, energism, and historicism. Bergson starts by criticizing the mainstream perception of “time” in his era. He concludes that transitions in consciousness eventually caused temporal movements. However, these changes in consciousness can only happen intuitively by hearing the becoming that encompasses the whole of life, rather than by affecting material conditions. This “becoming” spreads to every society and, every person. Hence, history does not progress mechanically or teleologically; rather the creative moves of “becoming” dynamically and contingently shape history. Drawing on this argument, Turkey’s Bergsonian conservatives claimed that the Turkish nation was also experiencing its “becoming” and “creative impulse” during the War of Independence and subsequent revolution. Therefore, the Turkish Revolution had to define its path, not according to some pre-given mechanical and universal laws, but rather by sensing and intuiting its own history, tradition, culture, and belief. Thus, Bergsonism easily intertwined with the existential aims of classical conservatism.

Tunç argued that history and life cannot be separated from each other. While the positive sciences are useful in analyzing inanimate objects, they are ineffective when analyzing biological, animate, conscious and moral human-subjects. There is an immanent power in both of these realms that permanently causes unforeseen changes. Evolution, for instance, is the result of such a creative power rather than progressing according to “mechanical rules” as Darwin suggested. Like all living things, societies also evolve so that, they can be liberated from their earlier su-



perstitutions. During such periods of enlightenment, history is carefully analyzed: those who conclude that past was more valuable than the present and future become conservative whereas those who optimistically embraced the idea of future become liberal. Thus liberals have supported the development of capitalism and focused on material wealth, whereas conservatives have struggled to preserve immaterial gains and social. Hence, political dualism arises from the uniqueness of “becoming”.

On the one hand, the Bergsonian conservative interpretation can be regarded as beneficial in terms of legitimating the War of Independence and the revolutions of the 1930s; on the other hand, seeing society organically as a whole, a mass and an essence underpins political majoritarianism rather than socio-political pluralism. By embodying itself in the formulation of society as an “unprivileged-classless-fused-mass” in a solidarist-corporatist way, Conservative Republicanism supported the passive revolution of the 1930s. It also paved the way for a later fetishized discourse of the “national will”, which became the core of the Turkish right’s discursive strategy during the 1950s. This understood democracy as reflecting electoral majorities and the arithmetic of the ballot, thereby reducing it to merely the number of votes. Finally, it also undermined political subjectivation in Turkish society by rejecting the existence of different classes and social groups in a democratic plurality. Thus, one can claim that there is less difference between Bergsonian-Tunçian and Durkheimian-Gökalpian philosophical and socio-political lines than it might seem at first.

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**Öz:** 1930'lar Türkiye'si oldukça tartışmalı bir sosyo-politik başlıktır. Bu konuda iki temel pozisyon saptanabilir: liberal-pozitivist olan 1930'lardaki dönüşümü ilerici bir hamle olarak görürken muhafazakar-idealist ise onu yukarıdan aşağı bir şekilde tarih ve gelenekten kopuş olarak değerlendirir. Bununla birlikte, ikisi arasında köprü olan başka okumalar da vardır. İşte bu çalışma, bunlardan birini çözümlmek için Mustafa Şekib Tunç, (1886-1958), bir Türk psikolog ve filozof, Henri Bergson (1859-1941), bir Fransız filozof, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) bir Fransız sosyolog ve Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) bir İtalyan filozof, arasında sonuncunun "pasif devrim" kavramı üzerinden 1930'lar Türkiye'sinin sosyo-politik dönüşümünü anlamaya katkı sunmak için bağlantılar kurmayı önermektedir. Temel argüman, anti-amprisist ve anti-pozitivist felsefesine ve Bergson'un spiritualist ve biyolojik-bütüncüllüğüne yaslanmasına rağmen, Tunç'un düşüncelerinin Durkheim'in pozitivist kolektivizmi ile buluşmaktadır. Bu, Tunç'un temel ifadesini "imtiyazsız-sınıfsız-kaynaşmış-kitle" ve organik toplum formülasyonunda bulan 1930'ların pasif devrimini bir "muhafazakar devrim" olarak yorumlamasını mümkün kılmaktadır. Tunç, Bergson'u izleyerek, tarihi ve toplumu biyolojik bir şekilde, toplum içindeki sosyo-politik bölünmeleri ve mücadeleleri maskeleyen yarayan sosyo-işlevsel bir bütün olarak kavrar.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Mustafa Şekib Tunç, muhafazakarlık, Henri Bergson, pasif devrim, Türk siyasal hayatı.

