Heidegger’s Antigone: The Ethos of Poetic Existence

Heidegger’in Antigone’şi: Şiirsel Varoluşun Ethos'u

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Abstract: In this article, I elucidate Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone from a topological point of view by focusing on the place-character of Antigone’s poetic ethos. Antigone’s decision to defy Creon’s order and bury her brother Polynices is discussed as a movement that underpins her poetic disposition as a demigod. Antigone’s situatedness between gods and humans is identified as the place of poetic dwelling, and the significance of Antigone’s relation to the polis is explained. The main argument of the article is two-fold: 1) When we read Antigone focusing on the notion of dwelling, we can better make sense how Heidegger’s engagement with the question of finitude closes the envisioned gap between ontology and ethics. 2) The idea of poetic dwelling is a confrontation with spatio-temporal limits of human existence, and requires a more holistic way of thinking about the place of humans in the world, thinking beyond being-action dichotomy.

Keywords: Martin Heidegger, Antigone, topology, ancient Greek tragedy, poetic dwelling, place.
Introduction

Being one of the most ancient literary forms of drama, tragedy questions humans’ struggle against necessity. Modern German philosophers such as Hegel, Hölderlin and Nietzsche took issue with the strife between natural necessity and human freedom in their particular interpretations of ancient Greek tragedy (Foti, 2006: 8). In a certain way, post-Kantian German philosophy can be considered to offer various original responses to “is-ought” dilemma, first put forward by Hume in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), which I take to reflect humans’ situatedness between necessity and freedom, as well as facts and values. This translates into the envisioned gap between being and action, which separates ontology, or *prima philosophia*, and ethics as two philosophical subdisciplines maintained long since Hellenistic philosophy. While ontology deals with the question of the meaning of being, ethics inquiries how to comport oneself in the world. As the former concerns the nature (*physis*) of things, the latter asks how we are to respond to how things are. Here thinking with the notion of *ethos* can help us rethink the boundaries between being and action by problematizing their situated-ness between “what is” and “what ought”. In that context, the importance of Heidegger’s philosophical contribution to the interpretation of the core issue of tragedy lies in his attempt to set aside the strict being-action dichotomy by pointing towards a unity by thinking human *ethos* via the notion of dwelling (*wohnen*), which requires a topological inquiry by focusing on the place (*topos*) of dwelling.

1. The Question of Dwelling as *Ethos*

Heidegger’s interpretation of Sophocles’ *Antigone* (441 BC) is a multi-faceted one. This includes his efforts to engage with the Greek way of being¹, attempting to position himself between Hölderlin and ancient Greek philosophers². Heidegger’s philosophy in the 1930s and 1940s develops on

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¹ Of course, who Heidegger’s Greeks are has been critically scrutinized by contemporary philosophers as well as scholars in classical studies. To the extent that Heidegger’s focus emerges from his idea that thinking and poetizing constitute a primordial neighbourhood for the study of the meaning of being, his interpretations of Greeks is unmistakably idiosyncratic. Therefore, the aim of this article is to first deepen our understanding of Heidegger rather than achieving an objective interpretation of Greek tragedy. For more on the issue, see Glenn Most’s comprehensive critique of Heidegger’s Greeks (Most 2002).

² Explaining the historical background of ancient Greek tragedy in Heidegger’s thought,
the basis of his engagement with Hölderlin’s poetry3, which results from Hölderlin’s own dialogue with Greek tragedy4. Heidegger’s encounter with the fundamental concepts of Greek philosophy in the 1930s and 40s does not take Aristotle’s Poetics as its point of departure, but through Hölderlin’s (and also Nietzsche’s) interpretation of Greeks, as well as his own readings of Presocratic philosophers such as Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides. Heidegger’s statement in the Letter on Humanism is worth rethinking in this context:

The tragedies of Sophocles - provided such a comparison is at all permissible - preserve the ethos in their sayings more primordially than Aristotle’s lectures on “ethics.” A saying of Heraclitus that consists of only three words says something so simply that from it the essence of ethos immediately comes to light. (Heidegger, 1998: 269)

Here Heidegger is referring to the fragment 119 of Heraclitus, which reads “ήθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων” and is usually translated as “a man’s character is his daimon” (Heidegger, 1998: 269). According to Heidegger, this translation stresses the sense of one’s personal moral character, but does not take into consideration how one’s character occurs from one’s dwelling. Therefore, we need to rather think of it as: “The human being dwells, insofar as he is a human being, in the nearness of god” (Heidegger, 1998: 269). Departing from the etymology of the word ethos (ἦθος), Claudia Baracchi illustrates how one’s way of being is tied to one’s way of inhabiting a place: “Finally, ethos names the exquisitely human abode – most basically, but not only, in the sense of the land in which a people settles the geo-political space in which a community is as such constituted and lives” (Baracchi, 2008: 54). This point has drawn the attention of many other contemporary...

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3 Bernasconi clarifies why Hölderlin’s poetry was important for Heidegger: Hölderlin was the poet who, if the Germans decided in his favor by listening to the language of his poetry, could lead them to another place, a place where Western metaphysics no longer held sway. This is why Hölderlin was for Heidegger not one poet among others, but a destiny for philosophy. (Bernasconi, 2013: 146)

4 Krell elucidates in great detail the background of Hölderlin’s engagement with Greek tragedy and poetry (Krell, 2005: 250-256).
scholars such as Nancy (2002), Malpas (2006) and Artemenko (2016), indicating that ethics as ethos exceeds the limits of moral philosophy. Thought as dwelling, ethos encompasses both natural necessity (being bound to a specific time and place) and human freedom (reappropriating that which delimits us). In that regard, an inquiry on the meaning of dwelling amounts to an investigation of the place or topos of humans, especially in the sense of their existential orientation, or their situatedness, in the world. In the same vein of thinking, drawing on Plato’s dialogue of Symposium, Krell finds a parallel between the notion of daimon and the between, both of which playing a key role in Heidegger’s thought starting from the late 1920s and onwards. Krell’s core argument is that “the realm of the daimonic” is the between that gathers the world, and thus opens up to the very idea of life. (Krell, 1992: xi). It is against this background that Antigone’s existential situation between humans and gods needs to be discussed as the kind of ethos that Heidegger calls “poetic dwelling”, one that urges us to reconsider the boundaries of ethics and ontology.

2. Heidegger’s Antigone: Becoming-at-Home

Let me here summarize the main plot of Sophocles’ Antigone. Creon seizes the throne of Thebes from the old king Oedipus, as a consequence of a throne fight between two brothers, Eteocles and Polynices, as the two brothers kill each other in the struggle hoping to become the king. Creon, who takes over the kingdom, commands that the dead body of Polynices should be left to rot in the open, outside of the city, without a burial ceremony and whoever may attempt to bury him shall be stoned to death. Antigone rises against this order and decides to bury her brother Polynices at the expense of breaking the law and be killed. Although she tries to convince her sister Ismene to join her in standing against Creon, Ismene acts in accordance with Creon’s edict. As Antigone’s burial of her brother is acknowledged, Antigone is imprisoned by Creon. Although Ismene renounces her decision and apologetically wishes to be imprisoned with her sister, Antigone refuses. Even if Creon regrets his decision to condemn Antigone, in the end Antigone commits suicide. Antigone’s death leads to a series of deaths and suicides in Creon’s own family, as the latter loses Antigone’s fiancé and his son Haemon as well as his wife Eurydice.
In contemporary Heidegger scholarship, much emphasis is given to his *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935); however, it is the lesser known *The Ister* (1942) lecture courses that provide a more comprehensive analysis of *Antigone* by engaging with the problem of dwelling. In the second division of *The Ister* lecture courses, Heidegger sets out to discuss the meaning of home (*Heim*) and homeliness (*Heimlichkeit*) as key concepts tied to his understanding of the poetical dwelling of Antigone. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Antigone is the “uncanniest of the uncanny” (TI 51, 61-63), which is also a characterization of the essence of the poet (TI 64). Antigone is the uncanniest of all mortals due to the specific relationship in which she stands to her own mortality and finitude (TI 104). In order to flesh out Antigone’s poetic ethos, Heidegger focuses on the word *deinon*, which he takes to be an indication of the three fundamental aspects that ground Antigone’s actions. Accordingly, Antigone’s actions are: (1) Fearful (*Furchtbar*) (2), Powerful (*Gewaltig*) and, (3) Inhabitual, in the sense of “wontless” or unfamiliar (*Ungewöhnlich*) (TI 63). Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greek *deinon* as *Unheimliche*, literally meaning “not homely, or home-like”, gathers together the manifold essence of Antigone’s character and actions into a single word. Here, the English translation of Heidegger’s interpretation of the word “uncanny” must be also thought in relation to the original German word, which literally says “un-homely”. The German word that means “inhabitual, unfamiliar” (*Ungewöhnlich*) derives from the verb *wohnen*, which signifies to dwell, live, reside in a place. This point is important to keep in mind that for Heidegger, Antigone’s uncanny ethos is determined by her way of dwelling, and in turn, her dwelling is what forms the limits of her ethos on the basis of her relation to home and homelessness.

Heidegger’s main idea is that “becoming-homely” (*Heimischwerden*) and thereby reappropriating one’s relation to one’s home is fundamentally

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5 References to *The Ister* lecture courses will be abbreviated as TI, followed by the page number in the English translation.
6 *Das Ungeheure*, “monstrous”, is Hölderlin’s own translation of Greek “*deinon*”. (Hölderlin, line: 349-352). Schmidt explains that in his translations Hölderlin’s primary objective was to not appeal to “intelligibility”, but to make German language imitate ancient Greek, at the expense of alienating German language, to replicate the so-called oriental and eccentric attitude of Greece and the Greek language. (Schmidt, 2001: 143-144). Concerning the issue of the translation and interpretation of *deinon*, see the pages 145 and 246.
different from being settled at home. Despite the common view, for Heidegger dwelling does not simply denote a psychological sense of belonging to a place, but rather being able to re-appropriate one’s relation to the place that one inhabits (TI 21). Dwelling can only be poetical, insofar as it means to make space for a new manner of inhabiting the home. In other words, by getting absorbed in the traditions, habits, conventions and moral values of one’s environment, the possibility of dwelling poetically disappears. As I will discuss, Antigone’s actions appear to be the exact opposite of such non-dwelling in the sense of being only encompassed at home. Consequently, Heidegger engages with the question of the polis in order to arrive at a new idea of politics, one that is to be built on poetic attentiveness that makes space rather than on a cultural or ideological sense of attachment and absorbedness.

As Antigone goes to bury her brother, her kinship with the dead ones comes to fore as a striking feature of her character. Antigone says:

And if I have to die for this pure crime/ I am content, for I shall rest beside him/ His love will answer mine/ I have to please The dead far longer than/ I need to please The living /with them, I have to dwell forever. (Antigone, lines: 71-75.)

Being able to go beyond the limits of the ordinary indicates one’s resoluteness for a dwelling that opens up a new horizon of being within which all can be reinterpreted. Antigone achieves this by way of measuring the meaning of her death. Within the overall context of Heidegger’s philosophy, this is suggestive of being able to go beyond the limits of “the They” (das Man) (Heidegger 1967). Antigone is resolved to face her own finitude which shall define her fate, and not the norms of everydayness imposed upon her. Here the chorus, which is critical of Antigone’s decision, represents the common sense of the everydayness by embodying the moral norms of the city, though the poet, as the subject of poetic dwelling, is capable of transgressing the limits of everydayness (Heidegger, 2000a: 176). Antigone’s becoming homely in the counter movement against the law of the polis is a movement in which she is directed to find her true heimat, as well as her proper disposition. In that regard, Antigone’s action is a great source of awe for the common sense of the chorus.
Nonetheless, Antigone knows the limits of her dwelling: she can neither dwell with the alive nor with the dead. In the following lines, Antigone voices this sense of betweenness in the face of death:

Unfortunate that I am— Neither living among those who are alive, nor Dwelling as a corpse. Among corpses, having no home with either the living or the dead. (Antigone, lines: 909-913)

Indeed, Antigone has a fundamentally different disposition compared to Ismene. Antigone is at home in not being-at-home, knowing deeply her approaching proper end, which is not the case for Ismene. Beautiful, communicative and politically correct, Ismene’s destiny seems to be a fortunate one. Yet, Antigone’s unsettledness in the polis also unsettles Ismene’s ordinary existence. Antigone’s burial of Polynices breaks the law of the city, and locates her fate beyond the limits of the polis as well as beyond what is acknowledged as customary and habitual. In the act of burying Polynices, she is in a complete state of seclusion, abandoned even by Ismene who is supposed to support her. By performing an action that no one else in the kingdom of Thebes can dare, Antigone prefers homelessness to rootlessness. She chooses her own death over an existence whose consequences she would not be able to bear. In other words, Antigone’s etbos is “authentic” in the sense that she “authors” the direction of her fate. Simply said, she re-appropriates her necessity as her own freedom; what bounds her also becomes what liberates her, which is where the poetic power of her actions lies. Where Antigone’s tragedy comes to end, Ismene’s own commences, for in the end Ismene is exposed to Antigone’s unsettledness in a way she can no longer avoid. For Heidegger, being capable of dying one’s own death, which is the ultimate experience of existential anxiety (Angst), is the poetic measure of dwelling that Antigone’s etbos displays.

3. Antigone’s Homecoming: Beyond the Polis

In contemporary interpretations of Antigone (Wright 1999; Butler 2000), there is a tendency to concentrate on the moral and political aspects of Sophocles’ tragedy. Antigone stands in a fierce opposition to Creon, and  

7 Antigone has the poetic etbos in that she has the capacity to dare (tolma) in her violent uncanniness. She is the poetic one, who sets out into the “un-said”, “who breaks out into the un-thought” (Heidegger, 2000b: 172).
If he is the head of the polis, then, Antigone’s defiance of the law at first appears as a political action. Antigone’s actions are considered essentially as a way of fulfilling her political identity within the confines of the city, as a woman, a daughter, and a citizen under repression. While Ismene submits to the state-power, which according to Creon represents the authority of the law and civilization, Antigone goes against it by her extreme loyalty to the blood relationship, a loyalty that is normally expected to be shown for the polis (Knox, 1992: 76).

In her critique of Heidegger, Kathleen Wright summarizes Heidegger’s reading as a “forgetfulness of the ethical difference” (Wright, 1999: 170). In comparing Hegel’s Antigone with Heidegger’s interpretation, her main argument is based on the idea of Heidegger’s oblivion of the sexual difference, as well as the prioritization of deinon over dike (justice). This results in the contrast between “ethical difference between family law and state law” and “ontological difference between poetic dwelling on the earth and the technical mastery of the world” (Wright, 1999: 173). According to Wright, it is Hegel who offers a more convincing interpretation by proposing that the conflict between the obligations to family and state are the most foundational sources of ethical conflicts. Accordingly, Heidegger’s thought is oblivious of the sexual difference that cannot be separated from the character of Antigone. This is why, Wright argues, Heidegger cannot appropriately address the question of the ethics.

One question that appears here is whether and how we are to distinguish the ethical from the ontological as such. In other words, how can Antigone’s dwelling be characterized only ontologically (that which concerns her being) or ethically (that which concerns her moral character)? It must be also noted that there are different understandings of the ethical that are at issue here, which may be the major source of disagreement between Wright and Heidegger’s interpretations. Foti deliberately recognizes this point, as she distinguishes the Hölderlinian paradigm of reading Antigone, which she considers to be followed by Nietzsche and Heidegger against the Hegelian understanding of ethics as Sittlichkeit and the self-realization of Spirit (Foti, 2006: 14), which itself is a response to Kant’s deontological ethics as Moralität. While Hegel’s understanding of ethics involves the tension between the state-law and history on the grounds of family
kinship and the shift from a matriarchal society towards our patriarchal society, in the Hölderlinian paradigm it becomes a matter of correspondence between mortals and immortals, namely a poetic ethics.

In view of this, commentators such as Nikolopoulou (2012) defend the line of thinking that considers the source of Antigone’s poetic transgression to be pre-political, since one’s heroic temper is an ontological necessity and is not necessarily a political act, despite its political consequences. According to Knox, Antigone’s *ethos* has two characteristics. Antigone is *autonomos*, “a law unto itself”, and *autognos orga*, “passion self-conceived”. Antigone’s actions are “not to be explained by outside circumstances” (Knox, 1992: 67). From the very outset, Antigone acts in accordance with what she ought to do on the basis of her very being, and she is not capable of acting differently (Knox, 1992: 62). What Antigone struggles against, namely, the lawlessness of Creon’s order, is a mean to deal with a far more fundamental issue, that is the limits of human mortality –via Polynices’ and her own–. Her struggle against fate and necessity is what de-limits and defines her existence, that is, her being exposed to death in and by the *polis*. As a result, Antigone’s confrontation with the living, by siding with the dead against time, has more poetic significance than a political revolt against the order of the state. Antigone’s action is an experience of an existential sense of holiness that she wishes to endure and persist, one that exceeds the boundaries of a mortal’s desire to live. By deciding to dwell in the *polis*, it is Ismene who embraces the “political” *ethos* versus Antigone’s poetic dwelling. Antigone’s *ethos* amounts more than being a woman or a man, a daughter or a sibling. Ever since the commencement of the play, she is on the way beyond the *polis*.

While the notion of *polis* is indeed a key one in Heidegger’s *The Ister* lecture courses, Heidegger’s idea of the political is not a conventional one. For Heidegger, the *polis* cannot be appropriately made sense of by going to the word political. On the contrary, the political is to be determined on the basis of an understanding of what the *polis* is. In turn, the *polis* is where humans’ dwelling occurs. It is in this context that Heidegger’s topological

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8 This is also the sense in which Nikolopoulou raises her concerns regarding a narrowly framed feminist reading of Antigone (Nikolopoulou, 2012: 178).
focus on the issue reunites the ontological and the ethical. The *polis* is founded upon the unconcealedness of things (*alētheia*), which refers to the site (*Ort*) in which all beings and all relational comportment toward beings is gathered (TI 86). It is not the “human ventures and procedures” (*poros*) that determine the *polis*, but rather, the very emergence of nature as *physis* that makes space for anything political to come to appearance in the first place. Yet, without the *polis*, the experience of *physis* as *physis* cannot come into the open either. It is in that sense, the river Ister (Danube), flowing in the direction against its source, and Antigone, going beyond the walls of the *polis*, show forth the same *ethos* (TI 166). The fact that Heidegger deals with Antigone’s dwelling in his *The Ister* lecture courses in connection with Hölderlin’s hymn is crucial. Heidegger’s approach hints at the unity between the streaming activity of the river and the uncanny dwelling of Antigone, as for Heidegger, the poetic agent and the river have the same dwelling. In that regard, the holiness of nature and the nature of the holy appear as two sides of the same phenomenon that remind to humans the limits of their existence. Only with such a holy sense of nature, the political can truly find back its way in the *polis*. Antigone runs away from the politics as we know it; if Antigone is to be political, the limits of the political commences from a holy experience of *physis* at the limits (*peras*) of the *polis*, but not within it.

4. The Demigod: Between Humans and Gods

In the 1930s and 1940s, Heidegger claims that the dwelling place of the poet is between (*das Zwischen*) human beings and gods. In *The Ister* lecture courses, he argues:

The poet of such poetizing therefore necessarily stands between human beings and gods. He is no longer merely a human being. Yet for the same reason he is not, indeed never is, a god. From the perspective of this "between" between humans and gods, the poet is a "demigod". (TI 139)

According to Heidegger, humans are situated between the earth and

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9 For more on this topic, see Young 2002; Gosetti-Ferencei 2004.
10 Likewise, according to Knox, there are religious underpinnings of Antigone's actions, as her pious relation to the gods of the underworld and her reverence for the gods go beyond concerns for the *polis* (Knox, 1992: 98).
the sky. Existing as mortals, they must learn to confront the temporal limits of their finitude, which places them in a confrontation with those who are not able to die and stand in a different relation to time, namely immortals. Only if this belonging together of the *fourfold* (*Geviert*)\(^\text{11}\), as the spatio-temporal correspondence of existence is established, then humans can dwell.

At this point, Lacan’s summary of Antigone is similar to that of Heidegger: “This then is how the enigma of Antigone is presented to us: she is inhuman” (Lacan, 1992: 263). Antigone's persistence against the occurrence of time allows her to attract the appraisal of the gods, and brings her closer to the domain of immortals. Nikolopoulou astutely draws our attention to the following line: "Yes, you go to the place where the dead are hidden, / but you go with distinction and praise" (lines 878–79)” (Nikolopoulou, 2012: 15). In that sense, the betweenness at issue is not the hermeneutic middle ground (*Mitte*) that we observe in Gadamer’s philosophy. It may be useful to consider the following passage from Heidegger’s later thought to make sense of how the specific idea of the hermeneutical underpins Heidegger’s notion of the between:

… *hermeneuein* is that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message. Such exposition becomes an interpretation of what has been said earlier by the poets who, according to Socrates in Plato’s *Ion* (534e), *bermenes eisin ton theon* are “interpreters of the gods”. (Heidegger, 1971: 29).

The situatedness of the poet in the between does not imply mere mediocrity. The between is not a gap that requires to be bridged between already established poles (Mitchell, 2015: 282). On the contrary, it is owing to the dwelling of the poet in the between, the dwelling of humans and gods appear as such. The poet encounters before anyone the emergence of being, the meaningful manifestation of things and brings it into the limits of language and the shared-horizon of intelligibility. With such a horizontal awareness of that which is to be understood and interpreted, the poet renders the holy accessible by inhabiting the between. Without the poets, there can be no ordinary or divine language, thus no meaningful dwelling.

To make sense of Heidegger’s idea of the poet and poetic dwelling,

\(^{11}\) For more detailed analysis of the “fourfold”, see Malpas 2006, Mitchell 2015.
one needs to understand that Heidegger aims to replace the biological-psychological notion of human being as rational animal with a non-subjective conception. His thinking of ethos related to the question of dwelling and the place of dwelling is suggestive of this approach. For Heidegger, dwelling is not simply coping with the environing world as a subject, but a manner of being that happens upon humans in the open\footnote{Compare early and later Heidegger on the equivalence of sein and wohnen (Heidegger, 1967, 54; 2000:149).}. Humans are those who are capable of dwelling in the openness of being, namely in the place of the meaningful unconcealment of things as discursive mortals. It is in that sense that Heidegger’s question of being (Sein) is the same as the question of dwelling as ethos. The poetic agent discloses how to dwell in the “home of language”, experiencing the finite nature of existence in the nearness of divinities (or immortals). Insofar as Heidegger’s overall project is neither simply fundamental ontology nor originary ethics (Heidegger, 1998: 271), the unity at issue needs a more comprehensive approach, one that can think the place-being (Örtlichkeit) of the clearing (Lichtung). Reading Heidegger topologically, we can challenge the trifold being-action-logic discrimination of Hellenic philosophy by first taking into consideration humans’ relation to space and place.

**Conclusion**

If one’s actions are ways of responding to given situations in which one finds oneself, this means that being and action do not stand in a dualistic relation. In that light, Heidegger’s reading of Antigone does not endorse a strict discrimination between the so-called ontological and ethical differences, but rather opens up to discussion the very meaning of the ontological and the ethical. Antigone perceives the situation in which she finds herself as an opening to become who she already is. In other words, the situation offers her a way of enacting her poetic ethos. In interpreting Antigone, Heidegger’s primary concern is to bring into view humans’ liminal situation vis-à-vis death, that from which all both ontological and ethical questions emerge. The conflict with the state and the family figure in as political concerns, which outline the limits of humans’ confrontation with finitude, just as our specific manner of dealing with human finitude.
results in the establishment of various political institutions. The poetic dwelling of Antigone shows forth the horizon and possibility of reconciling *physis* and *polis*, and rethinking the *ethos* of the holy and the political.

**References**


Anahtar Kelimeler: Martin Heidegger, Antigone, topoloji, antik Yunan tragedyası, şairane, mekân.